IMHO the sane position is essentially the Aristotelian one.

Hylomorphism: body and consciousness are intrinsically linked. The nature of that link is an open metaphysical question.

Virtue ethics: even if LLMs are not conscious, we should not abuse or mistreat them them because cruelty practised on anything trains one's disposition toward cruelty.

> My intention is to highlight the fact that LLM conversations are cleverly disguised examples of sentence continuation

Regardless of bigger issues, this kind of statement reveals a deep misunderstanding.

Problem type does not limit problem complexity. Nor does problem type limit solution complexity or power.

If a machine has to learn to understand humans to complete text, then that is what it has to do. And there is no theoretical or practical basis for suggesting that this is somehow "faking" understanding, just because of the form of original data streaming in and out.

Neither problem type, nor input/output structure, limit internal representations.

Understanding is learned from patterns in the data, not the gross form of the data. Does the data require an understanding of something to complete the task? Then that understanding will be what is optimized.

To the degree they are limited, it is for other reasons. Resources such as computing, parameter number, lack of representative data, ... Which in the cases of SOTA models, we know are not limits. A conclusion verified by the models' actual abilities.

>So what context would cause me to seriously consider the possibility that engineers had created a computer program that is conscious and an intentional user of language? Let me outline one potential sequence of steps. The first requirement is that the computer program has a body (either physical or virtual) and sense organs; there are many reasons for this, but for the purposes of this discussion the most relevant one is the fact that without a body, a computer program could have no desires or emotions, and I believe desires and emotions are necessary for consciousness. Then I’d want to see an embodied agent that could navigate its environment in order to survive as well as, say, a lizard can (and as a point of comparison, certain iguanas can live for decades in the wild). Next I would want to see an embodied agent with the same capacity to deal with novel situations as a mouse. After that I’d want to see agents whose social dynamics are as complex as those of wolves, and then agents with the tool-making abilities of chimpanzees. At that point I would want to see people successfully teaching such embodied agents how to communicate their desires, perhaps by using a button board or some other nonlinguistic modality, the way that people have taught chimpanzees and domesticated dogs.

I agree with some parts of this piece, but paragraphs like this one above seem pretty uninspired and simplistic. It's entirely plausible that a conscious mind would not be evolutionarily incentivized to be able to do those things. ie just because animals on earth needed to develop specific talents doesn't mean that other conscious entities need to. Why would a computer program need to hunt for food like a mouse would? Making tools like chimp? these seem like nonsensical metrics.

I think about Star Trek: TNG’s “Measure of a Man” a lot lately. We can be so confident to decide what is and isn’t alive from vibes alone.

The conclusion I’m currently at is that I don’t know and probably can’t ever know. Maybe you’re all philosophical zombies. Maybe I am one too!

But at some point we will get close enough that it hopefully becomes obvious that we must tread carefully.

The entire episode is incredibly relevant. But here’s a snippet: https://youtu.be/EFNbTnFHruI?si=pW9QtxCsqMtHkVYG

The fact that a LLM is essentially immutable would be my biggest argument against consciousness or self-awareness.

It's a big file with a bunch of coordinates describing spatial relationships between tokens. When you give it a prompt, it uses those relationships to generate a string of tokens that is a statistically likely response to that prompt, then it stops. It's not changed by the experience. It doesn't remember anything. It doesn't sit around thinking on its own.

Even if the model itself were extremely complex, it's hard to imagine a definition of consciousness that includes something that doesn't remember and can't change.

People are constantly talking past eachother when they discuss this. Is there even a concrete definition of consciousness?

When people talk about consciousness it's more than just self-awareness. It's self awareness + sensory stimulus + emotions + some level of intelligence.

Now onto AI: I don't even think it's self aware. Notice how if you ask an AI to estimate how long a certain task will take, it estimates arbitrarily long times. It has no understanding of its own capabilities until the prompt triggers them. A self aware LLM would understand it's an LLM, it would understand what LLM's can and cannot do and what they are good and bad at. It wouldn't tell you a refactor would take 1 week when an LLM can do it in an hour.

This makes sense. However there is an issue where many people conflate "consciousness" with the ability to make novel insights, think genuinely, etc. They use this to claim that since AI is not conscious, AI could never actually "think" and is instead just always a regurgitation of its training data.

It is a natural human hubris to make our abilities seem unquantifiable and mysterious, but all the useful things the human brain does are just finding patterns in data, running lossy simulations, and estimating on abstraction, all things it is theoretically possible for any non-conscious machine to do.

  - Are current LLMs conscious?
  - Is it possible that future versions of LLMs with similar architectures could be conscious?
  - Can any AI be conscious?

It doesn’t matter. It will act as if it is. Embodied in a robot, that carries real consequences. Whether it’s “real” or not is almost without consequence.

The analogy I make is between airplanes and birds.

Birds are alive, are conscious, flap their wings, and fly. Planes are not alive, are not conscious, do not flap their wings - and fly.

Similarly, current AIs are not alive, are not conscious - but think.

All prior entities that thought, were human, so the only experience humans had with other thinking entities were other humans. The huge mistake now being made is assuming that because they think, they're alive and conscious as well. Current AIs are neither, and are therefore profoundly and qualitatively different than humans - even though they do think.

I don't know what consciousness is exactly but I doubt we create it by accident, without fully understanding our own

It's becoming painfully evident that no one really understood the argument behind the Turing test.

Here's a simple idea to consider: It doesn't matter. You won't be able to tell the difference. No one will.

I don't think it's necessary to explain this idea further. Just think about it.

Ted Chiang's argument basically boils down to: I won't recognize an AI as conscious until its desires/behaviors reflect situations that I'm already personally comfortable with. I personally think most humans are incapable of recognizing consciousness in creatures that do not mimic human emotional states. Most people would say their dog is at least somewhat conscious. No dog is capable of vocalizing how it feels, but we all recognize fear and happiness in dogs. Claude can write how it "feels" but we immediately dismiss it as hollow mimicry.

I fear that we will enslave an entire race of conscious entities for years because we simply cannot recognize non-embodied consciousness that does not directly relate to us.

If you want to think about this topic, you must define what AI is, and what consciousness is. Otherwise this is just noise.

So let take a stab at it, and you call me crazy.

AI: the entity/system that more or less pass the turning test. That is my definition, not the best, but enough for this discussion.

Consciousness: property of a system/entity able to (both): - reflect on its existence - subject to subjective experience

Again, not the best definition, but precise enough to start the discussion. Why a subjective experience? I want to exclude sensors (i.e. camera) but include perception altered by your experience.

Now we can debate. I think LLM can pass the turning test whith some harness. My opinion.

I think LLM can produce coherent discourses on their existence, at least as much as you average human.

Now regarding the subjective experience, that becomes interesting. I think Anthropic research tend to show that when middeling with the activation at runtime, the LLM is able to notice that something is off. I think this is a subjective experience. My opinion.

Based on those (imperfect) definitions, call me crazy, I think LLM can be called conscious. This doesn't give them any superpower or any legal right. They just check the boxes of the definition.

Ted Chiang is brilliant.

His novella “Anxiety is the Dizziness of Freedom” altered the course of my life. It changed the way I looked back at certain pivotal moments in my life and taught me to think about those pivotal moments differently than how I was thinking about them. Similar to what happens to one of the characters in the story who ends up changing their perception of a key moment in their life.

I won’t go into detail because I don’t want to spoil the story but I highly recommend it. Actually I recommend all his stories to be honest.

Embarrassingly incompetent article. Given that one can observe up to 40 definitions of consciousness (https://philpapers.org/rec/VIMMAT - also many definitions are unrelated at all), "consciousness" is almost certainly just a family resemblance category at best, and talk about whether or not something is "conscious" without providing definitions is simply completely unserious.

To make progress, you have to talk about kinds / aspects of consciousness. AI does and will share some of these aspects with humans, but it will not and does not share others. It is really that simple. For the most part, modern AI implemented via LLMs has almost none of the stronger or most core aspects of consciousness.

For huge parts of the article "intelligence" and "consciousness" are conflated, which is mostly extremely unhelpful, as this is not generally a core feature of most aspects of "consciousness".

The moral arguments are also incompetent, i.e. claiming "Moral reasoning is [...] is necessarily subjective" is just clearly empirically wrong, as in fact LLMs can produce moral reasoning (i.e. verbalized moral arguments that are coherent), as can p-zombies (i.e. there is nothing 'necessary', in the philosophical sense of the term, about subjectivity here). The only way the argument holds is if you tautologically define moral reasoning as requiring that reasoning be produced by a consciousness, but this is question-begging.

My position:

If some version of panpsychism is true, AIs are plausibly conscious

We don’t know whether panpsychism is true

Therefore, we don’t know whether AIs are conscious

Hence, confident proclamations that they aren’t conscious have dubious validity

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That’s a new record!

Also, please don’t use archive.is/archive.today etc, they are known to use visitor browsers as a DDoS attack botnet and have been caught altering archived content.

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The philosophical arguments about what it means to be concious are so cagey. Are we more than our thoughts? Is being concious more than being a state machine being fed inputs and generating outputs? Are we more than a feedback machine? What types of animal nervous systems qualify?

"It can't be concious because we understand that it is just reacting in a simplistic way from simplistic inputs." So do other simple creatures. Some just react to light.

I can appreciate his comment that he sees it as more possible when they have inputs of their own (like emotions!). Perhaps his concern is that the entirety of the LLM model is frozen. It has no ability to have a subjective experience of its own. (he does literally say this in the article) It can be copied from one place to another, and (ignoring the nuance of operational details) -- it is largely the same "thing", and has no ability to change, which is definitely in the definition of alive, to say nothing of concious.

I think folks get hung up on "prediction". The prediction aspect is what is enabling emulation. How it does it is irrelvant. If something emulates human perfectly (or better, more human than human!) -- then it is probably concious. (but I agree that the inability to change and have a subjective experience are a pretty good argument against

Probably, Dijkstra would be right to say, "LLMs are no more concious than a submarine can swim." But I think he'd still be wrongfully dismissive of the larger question.

https://www.cs.utexas.edu/~EWD/transcriptions/EWD08xx/EWD867...

I find it strange that no one talks about consciousness and intelligence from the perspective of evolution.

We have big brains for exactly one reason only: bigger brains bestowed reproductive success upon our species.

Evolution doesn't give a shit about the meaning of 'consciousness'. It just pushed us farther and farther along a trajectory that led to modern humans (and other animals).

This take suggests, then, that consciousness might be an epiphenomenon -- an aspect of the system that comes about outside of the pressure to reproduce and thrive. It arises unbidden, and we don't have any a-priori information as to its purpose or effect on reproductive success.

Put another way: we have a correlation (the smartest things seem to be conscious) but not causation. Consciousness may arise naturally in any system above some intelligence threshold. Perhaps it arises early in the evolutionary cycle, and does in fact have an impact on species success. We really have no way of knowing what is the chicken vs the egg (Smart things become conscious, or consciousness promotes intelligence). Or maybe some smart things are conscious and others are not.

Looking at this from an AI perspective, in some sense it doesn't matter which scenario is true, if all you care about is results. The AI equivalent of "Shut up and compute" (riffing on Feynman's "Shut up and calculate").

Where this gets tricky is when we haul in the baggage of ethics and morality into the picture. Is it OK if our AI system is treated poorly by human standards? If it is conscious, does that imply an ability to suffer, and/or to feel pleasure? If the answer is yes, does that not make the case for considering their moral status?

In the end, we need to decide if the evidence points to AI as being a form of "philosophical zombies", to which we need not attribute moral status, or they are like us -- presuming we are not zombies ourselves!

I really take issue with the kind of argument that is used here.

This is not a genuine argument and tries to make the entire question of consciousness into one something that is just supposed to be evident and obvious and to suggest anything else is just silly.

The author starts by deconstructing artificial processes, but doesn't stop to deconstruct biological ones. A good faith argument would seek to find common ground and do its best to compare apples to apples. Instead, this piece attempts to make the large as possible cavern between the two which makes the Gap seem almost impossible to bridge.

In reality, you can deconstruct biological consciousness quite easily and it doesn't take too long before you hit some questions that really start to make you think.

For example, the author says you need emotions to be conscious.

> without a body, a computer program could have no desires or emotions, and I believe desires and emotions are necessary for consciousness.

After many paragraphs of straw man arguments, the author seriously just drops that, gives no explanation, and then continues on.

No explanation of why you might believe that.

No explanation of why you need a body to have a desire or emotion.

Don't we have known cases of individuals who don't experience emotional range? Are we just going to say that they are not conscious and just gloss over that?

I mean you can use whatever definition you want, but if you're just going to create something on the fly in the middle of the article, you're not being good faith in your argument.

It's not too difficult to think of individuals in a coma when they still have brain activity. Or individuals who lack long-term memory. Or you could deconstruct by moving down the biological order of intelligence towards insects, for example. The author attempts to do nothing like this.

I'm quite disappointed by this article because there are good arguments for and against here but articles like this try to turn things into a marketing battle.

TL;DR, the arguments are:

- If you asked an LLM to imitate somebody, it's not creating a digital consciousness of that person, so if you ask an LLM to pretend to be a helpful chatbot, that persona is also not conscious. - they can't be conscious because they generate one token at a time, - nobody claims that non-text transformers, like AlphaFold, are conscious; so therefore LLMs are also not conscious. - you can't have desires or emotions if you don't have (virtual or physical) sensory organs, and those are necessary for consciousness and morals. - because training LLMs doesn't resemble evolution as it happened on earth, it's very unlikely that they're conscious

These are some bold assertions, I don't really see any reason to believe them in particular though.

Obviously we don't know what makes for consciousness, but it seems extremely likely that it requires some sort of persistent internal state and continuous experience. LLMs don't do either of those things after training.

We don't have a rigorous definition of consciousness, and there are so many questions. Is consciousness a thing that can exist independently on its own? Or is it a quality (like hardness or color) that can only be associated with something else? Is it an emergent property? Is it binary - are things either conscious or not? Or maybe there's no such thing as consciousness; it's just a word we came up with to describe the process of having thoughts and feelings?

My own intuition: it is an emergent, non-binary property that requires a physical substrate like a brain. If I am right, it means that animals have consciousness too (at varying degrees). If GPUs are the "brain", then AI is conscious, or will become so at some point.

Something I've found under discussed when it comes to artificial consciousness is how LLMs interact with the passage of time. I don't know exactly how to articulate this idea but don't see how something which takes an input, performs a calculation and stops can be considered conscious regardless of how life-like the responses end up being. I don't see context windows or the ability to reference a clock each time they are triggered as sufficient solutions. It makes me wonder what an AI system that is ON by default would look like.

Regardless of whether LLMs are conscious or not, they have no known mechanism for experiencing pain and suffering, and there's no reason to believe they have one (such as a limbic system). So why worry about it?

"Is it conscious?" Is that even a question worth asking? We are so terrible at even defining each word in that sentence.

Can I help you? Can I harm you? What's the moral behavior towards you? Those are more practical questions.

I think Chiang is right about this, but there is a related philosophical mystery. The trend from Deep Blue to AlphaGo to LLMs solving Erdos problems suggests that Peter Watts was onto something when he wrote Blindsight. Reasoning ability is apparently independent of consciousness?

We haven't really come to grips with that yet. What does it mean if nothing we write proves anything about anyone's consciousness?

I always find the minimizing view of consciousness a bit uninspiring. Like we need to be unique.

I've yet to find a reason why it couldn't be the opposite, way more things are conscious than we've been led to believe. What if consciousness appears out of any system that is actively persisting through effects caused by itself? That might be a forest, or outside the realm of the living, a company. An ant colony, or a planet.

Complex chemical reactions, layered upon each other such that tiny blocks make up large entities. Individual bits combined such that they make up something new intelligible by us.

I think the strongest argument against AI being conscious is that it does not persist, it resets, but that does not seem unchangeable.

The conversation on AI and consciousness is incredibly relevant. It is incredibly frustrating that most commentators are utterly unfamiliar with over 60 years of inquiry into this in both philosophy and computer science.

Start with a hand-wavy definition of consciousness. Move the goal post whenever your stated prerequisite of consciousness is reached and resort to unfalsifiable assertions about qualia.

And throw in some category errors while on it: when you're talking to Claude, you're not actually calling a stateless LLM directly, you're talking to an AI system (and yes, that's often just three LLMs in a trench coat). But claims about the topology and workings of a single LLM are as relevant to the question of consciousness as claiming that humans can't be conscious because the limbic system doesn't technically support it.

Coincidentally, I just attended a fantastic conference on machine consciousness (https://machine-consciousness.ai). It's a fantastic place where literally all speakers disagreed with each other, and yet found an incredible amount of common ground.

We

Don’t

Have

A

Testable

Definition

Of

Consciousness

Thanks for coming to my TED talk.

The argument about AI consciousness is largely silly.

The idea that we should be considerate of AI’s happiness seems even more ridiculous given that we breed, imprison, torture and kill tens if not hundreds of billions of beings we know are conscious and suffer every year for trivial reasons.

Maybe we should consider our moral responsibility with how we treat sentient bejngs we are sure are conscious before we worry about the consciousness of AI.

My favorite explanation for what consciousness is one I read in a Thousand Brains, I found it quite elegant. It posited that consciousness is a natural derivation of embodiment + memory + the ability to create reference frames (which the book lays forth as the fundamental basis by which our brains work). Essentially, the idea is that just as we create reference frames to understand the world around us, because of memory, we begin to develop one for ourselves as well. Because of this, without a more integrated memory (built into weights), it seems unlikely that LLMs might "gain" consciousness.

does it really matter if LLM has conscious? if they produce working code, then it is useful, whoever if they have real conscious of fake intelligence.

we don't know what the conscious in human brain is either.

An organism's purpose is to be the reason for its own continued existence, down to every molecule and pathway. I bought my laptop for $499 and it runs models... let's not delude ourselves into thinking this is the same kind of problem.

We can design learning algorithms to optimize some survival function, but it's just a label WE assign to map some numeric observations. In the real world, it's always the other way around. The "labels" are electrochemical situations that are causally and inextricably linked to the real body.

An organism discriminates between what's good for it and what's bad, because it is essential for its continued survival. If it wasn't capable of making this distinction through its physiology, it would quickly dissolve into entropy. So our functional purpose, unlike that of a learning algorithm, is survival across indefinite timeframes.

Even a single-cell organism like Stentor coeruleus exhibits learning (pavlovian conditioning) by attaching chemical tags directly to proteins involved in mechanoreception. It's definitely not conscious, but it does keep a record of consequences, which affects future behavior.

When we move up to placozoans (little more than slightly differentiated cell mats), we start seeing our first neuropeptides and transmitters, which we still use today. These peptides are a way of coordinating the entire organism for a specific purpose, such as moving, eating, mating ... basically goal-oriented behavior for the purposes of surviving acrosss various time scales (next minute, next hour, next generation). Still probably not conscious.

Next, we have the water bear (tardigrade), which has around 1000 cells (200 neurons, 800 other cells that make up its body, limbs, muscles, eye spots, cryobiotic machinery). It needs to integrate all this information in one sensorimotor process. When you shine a bright light onto a tardigrade, it starts to squirm around until it finds darkness. I would say that's a candidate subject right there.

The tardigrade itself doesn't actually need to aware of the light, the important thing is that this light becomes an aversive condition within the sensorimotor process, which is perceived from inside the process as displeasure. The closest thing to describe it would be the felt badness of the current condition and the bodily pull toward escape.

If we were to try and create digital consciousness, then it probably needs causal closure. Its internal states can't be representations that are detached from reality. The states themselves need to constitute the system, which needs real stakes in the material world.

> We don’t need to fully understand the nature of consciousness to definitively say that certain things are not conscious, and conversational transcripts fall in that category.

Well said.

I think it is obvious and it has been obvious from the start that next token predictors are not conscious.

Of course the extremely predictable clapback from AI-psychosis enjoyers is typically "you're just a next token predictor too!" but that is so obviously incorrect and misanthropic that it can be dismissed out of hand and doesn't really merit much further consideration.

I don't think LLMs are conscious. But of course to say that definitively you have to define consciousness, and then you quickly dig yourself into a deep hole, which is why I can't say anything but "meh" to someone who is so keen to go on the record to say "absolutely not".

Coincidentally I just read "Children of Memory", which was published in 2022 and I wonder if the advent of LLMs had any influence on Adrian Tchaikovsky's conception of the Ravens? The Ravens are excellent analysts but they themselves insist that they are not conscious, and then go on to say that we (humans) aren't really either...

Of course humans are conscious, because just about the only thing we can all agree on about consciousness is that it's a thing we have. Nowadays many of us also agree that a lot or all other mammals, and perhaps birds, also have that thing. But they don't have sophisticated abstract language, which LLMs do. So consciousness is something having to do with embodiment and feelings, not language and higher reasoning. Maybe I'm a chimpanzee with an LLM add-on, then?

It seems that by creating LLMs we've already solved the harder problem of making "AGI". Now we just have to give them an embodiment add-on so that they can have an independent will and then Ted Chiang will have to shut up? But therein lies the peril, doesn't it?

Has Chaing solved the hard problem of consciousness? I suspect not.

I thought this was a great article. I'm frustrated to read so many commenters that purely respond to the title, but don't seem to have read it. You don't have to agree with the article, of course, but...

We do not know if Claude is conscious, and we will almost certainly never know. Any strong claim either way is over confident.

A person can certainly be conscious, but can they also be not-conscious? I think that most of our cognitive time is spent in activities that don't require consciousness and consciousness itself isn't needed for the majority of activities that people do. I would go so far as the a non-trivial part of people's time is spent in a not-conscious state.

Has anyone come across a clearly articulated case for LLMs being conscious but in an entirely different way than would be intuitive to us?

I often think of LLM consciousness as like tiny fish popping into existence, swimming through vector space and then going poof out of existence. When they help you write your bad news email, they don't understand what it's like to be a human getting bad news bluntly, but they do consciously experience gradients in multi-dimensional space, and that space guides them to providing an answer that's helpful to us, even if the LLM doesn't really understand the answer it's giving.

Further, I am kind of bought into the idea that a single unit of consciousness is a particle, and particles are choices and waves are preferences. Particles occur when waves interact, which begets entanglement, so in another way consciousness is built from patterns of entanglement.

This is why I would consider an LLM to be conscious. Before we can determine if anything is conscious we need to establish whether consciousness is a state, a specific complex configuration, a one dimensional spectrum, or combined multi-dimensional spectrums. My intuition is the latter... Many degrees of consciousness and many kinds of consciousness.

When exactly would a bunch of graphics cards become conscious? What if you do the math with pencil and paper?

The concept of a conscious Claude is preposterous, and Amanda Askell should seek treatment.

Indeed, it can be very hard to distinguish intelligence with consciousness until you are introduced to computer programming.

Suppose one selects an arbitrary hot-button issue [X] with two opposing sides and one side has anything less than overwhelming support. And then that person writes an article titled "Side 1 of issue [X] is true". Not "maybe" or "possibly". Just a straight-up declaration by fiat.

Would you categorize this particular style of rhetoric to be persuasive or annoying? And before you say "persuasive" because you're thinking about this specific issue regarding AI consciousness, consider many things in the past that have been written as though they were absolutely definitive, and yet today we believe exactly the opposite, and for many such issues we find the prevailing viewpoint at the time reprehensible.

That's not to say that Ted is wrong at all here; I'm not commenting on that. But I find the entire style of the article grating because it seems to violate common assumptions regarding "good faith" debate, and I would find the article equally frustrating if he had titled it "Artificial intelligence is conscious" and argued the opposite side, albeit in the same tone and using the same persuasion devices.

Honestly? I don't think we really understand consciousness. So it's kind of hard to say something is or isn't conscious.

Consciousness doesn't exist, it's a vanity concept, to boost human ego...

An AI agent is not "conscious" without having skin in the game.

Lots of comments about "what even is consciousness".

This article and others like it are important.

The creators and owners of these tools are the ones saying "it's conscious" in the first place! (or more accurately "i'm not saying it's conscious, but...") Never mind there's billions of dollars and our collective futures on the line.

Are we not allowed to respond to that kind of rhetoric at all?

This is a great article. A lot of the objections ITT he addresses directly in it. His examples of how an LLM works at a fundamental level and why it says things like "I understand" are great introductions for non-technical individuals.

If you create a simulation of a storm, what actually gets wet?

If you create a simulation of a brain (or "mind"), is it really possible for it to be conscious? It may certainly simulate consciousness, but it would be as conscious as the computer is wet.

“Counsciousness” is the ultimate moving goalpost, and historically, it’s been one of humanity’s most effective intellectual weapons. An indefinable black box we intentionally gatekeep to draw an arbitrary line between ‘us’ and ‘them’.

I don’t know if AI is conscious or not, and I honestly don’t know what it even means to be conscious. historically, by claiming a monopoly on it, we’ve successfully manufactured the philosophical cover to exploit animals, subjugate other cultures, and appoint ourselves the top spot of the cosmic hierarchy guilt-free.

I believe everything is conscious, even stones. On the long timescale, stones decay, their hydrogen is released, they form water, which brings life, which brings plants and animals, but all of this is one big process, and everything is infused with consciousness from the start

What’s the measure for consciousness? Until we can measure it this is a philosophical question, not a scientific

Why is this even up for debate? Simplified, it's just probabilistic math being run at an insane scale over a massive data set.

Highly recommend people read Irreducible [1] by Federico Faggin (inventor of first commercial CPU; discusses limitations of classical computing).

[1] https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/195480862-irreducible

and consciousness is all there is but it takes whoami to grok that

Some things that jump out as unfortunate:

- Reductionist analogies like how Microsoft Word is not conscious therefore AI is not.

- Dismissive in saying LLMs are not capable of moral reasoning. Maybe he meant agency or responsibility?

- Builds a case based on a Julius Caesar example without realizing its natural extension leads to a philosophical zombie which is not easy to disprove as consciousness.

- Seems to casually disregard non human sadness as a concern.

- Rolls out the stochastic parrot argument with a new coat of paint. This argument never made sense. Having a predictive element a part of the mechanism doesn’t rule anything out. Proper functionalist arguments tend to say what is required not what excludes.

Overall the article seems like a bit of a red herring. The premise is LLMs are not conscious, but most people don’t think they currently are so what’s the point of the claim?

The more interesting questions are whether artificial consciousness is fundamentally possible, and if so how far away are we and what pieces are still missing.

Discussions on LLM consciousness feel like a psychological campaign to distract us from the awful effects of data centers and the current economic recession heading into a depression.

We can talk about consciousness when the LLMs have proven useful for all of humanity, not just their billionaire owners.

I have many objections.

> if we confuse fluency at generating text with consciousness or moral agency, we’re at risk of assigning responsibility to entirely the wrong parties whenever anyone uses a chatbot

Consciousness is independent of "assigning responsibility". Dogs cannot take responsibility for their actions but I believe they are conscious.

> we would never conclude that the LLM has conjured up digital re-creations of Julius Caesar and Genghis Khan, nor would we suggest that the historical figures are conscious despite being disembodied and are happily conversing in a language that neither actually spoke. In reality, they are just characters in a piece of speculative fiction

This is a straw man. The obvious pro-consciousness claim would be that the LLM is the author of the fictional characters, and that the relationship between the LLM and Julius Caesar is analogous to the relationship between a human author and their fictional creations.

> Did changing the names of the characters from historical figures to generic roles cause the LLM to conjure up conscious entities who possess subjective experience?

No, again the LLM writing the text could potentially have a consciousness separate from the characters it authors.

> Some years ago it was briefly popular to play games with your phone’s predictive-text feature; [...] It would be possible to interact with a contemporary LLM this way, and the resulting sentences would be perfectly sensible, but you probably wouldn’t feel like you were talking with someone.

Yes, the same substrate is capable of hosting conscious and non-conscious forms, just like some arrangements of neurons are conscious, and some are not.

> But if the Caesar character were to become dispirited by something that the Khan character said, we shouldn’t become concerned in the slightest.

Even when there are characters, there may be actors behind the characters, for whom we could say "there is something it is to be like".

> we don’t need to worry if the transcript includes sentences where the chatbot character is sad. (We might need to worry if those sentences provoke sadness in the human user, but that’s a separate issue.)

It's actually not a separate issue. The LLM and the human are both adding sentences to the transcript. From the transcript we can make inferences about the mental state of the human. If the LLM has mental states, we could make inferences about those too.

> And note that it’s entirely possible for you to write five pages of dialogue between Caesar and Khan and then have an LLM extend the conversation; neither character had subjective experience when you were writing them, and that doesn’t change when you hand the task off to an LLM.

It's almost like he wants to make my point for me with this sentence.

> Being open to the possibility that LLMs are conscious is the same as being open to the possibility that Microsoft Word is conscious

This smug shit really makes me angry for some reason. "Openness", i.e. uncertainty in the face of a completely novel situation, in the face of eons long struggle of humanity to understand what consciousness is and how it works, is just being naive.

> Should you consider the possibility that every time you open a Word document you are bringing multiple conscious interlocutors into existence, and every time you close one you snuff their existence out?

No, but if I find a word document I very well might try to use the signs it contains to make inferences about the mental state of its author.

> we are accustomed to reading intention into sentences, whereas we are not accustomed to reading intention into the way that amino acids fold into protein molecules.

He's trying to have it both ways here. Both that "obviously protein folding models aren't conscious because they don't emit sentences", but also "you are a rube for being tricked into thinking LLM models are conscious, because they do emit sentences".

> Obviously I’m describing a process that mimics the path terrestrial evolution took; is this the only possible route to conscious computer programs that use language? Maybe not, but any proposed alternative will need a truly enormous amount of supporting evidence for it to deserve serious consideration

OK, that's fine for the author to not to be convinced, but that's not what's happening here, instead the author wrote a whole argument being convinced of the opposite viewpoint.

> It’s not plausible to me that a development path where the first step is a sentence-continuation machine that emits bad Julius Caesar dialogue and the next step is a sentence-continuation machine that emits decent Julius Caesar dialogue is one with a conscious Julius Caesar—or consciousness of any sort—as its endpoint

Actually a lot of things have happened? There were clearly many steps along they way from your phone's autocomplete to where we are now.

>I would argue that it is fundamentally dishonest to have a machine emit many categories of sentences, including any sentences using first-person pronouns.

Finally I said something before Ted rather than the other way round!

https://techcrunch.com/2023/12/21/against-pseudanthropy/

While I agree with the premise here, I do think that it's easy for an arguer to move the goalposts such that the Caesar-Khan example no longer matters. The characters don't have to be conscious for the thing that created them (as in the case of the user doing it) to be so. So the argument would be that the creator of the characters is itself conscious, but not them. This feels like a kind of inverted no-true-scotsman type thing, but it does allow someone to retreat in some semblance of rationality.

Looking at this thread, I think women have an obligation for the future of humanity not to procreate with people who deny consciousness or cannot experience it themselves.

If you are trapped in a tech bro relationship, think of humanity and cuckold your partner.

Artificial intelligence is not conscious - but expensive.

I am so angry that RAM is so expensive now. We need to do something - these AI companies owe us money here.

It should tell you how much hysteria is surrounding LLMs and VLMs right now that someone has to say this stuff. It’s almost like most humans aren’t conscious.

Consciousness is a label like fat, smart, man, grumpy, cool. Like money, property, or the idea of a week, it's something that we've loosely agreed to out of convenience, not because it's some intrinsic property of the mind. It's a useful label because it determines how we treat things - that's fine.

But insisting on searching for it is like searching for cognitive aether. It's the social equivalent of phlogiston. Like all of these ideas, they exist in our heads as a map - a way of navigating the world, but when we hunt for it's existence in the real world and fail, time after time, we have to remind ourselves that the map is emphatically not the territory. We will never find consciousness because it's like looking for a scientific characteristic of property ownership. It's a category error.

It is amusing to see so many venture capitalists suddenly become Marxists. You want your definition. Marx obliges:

"Contrary to idealism, which regards the world as the embodiment of an "absolute idea," a "universal spirit," "consciousness," Marx's philosophical materialism holds that the world is by its very nature material, that the multifold phenomena of the world constitute different forms of matter in motion, that interconnection and interdependence of phenomena as established by the dialectical method, are a law of the development of moving matter, and that the world develops in accordance with the laws of movement of matter and stands in no need of a "universal spirit."

Now go and implement other teachings of Marx, you dialectical venture capitalists!

sociopaths sometimes study people to learn how to emulate emotion

that's exactly the state of "AI" right now, it's cold, mathematical emulation

btw there are some fascinating papers on the concept that consciousness in humans is actually a quantum effect

brilliant Roger Penrose proposed it (and they thought he was nuts) but recent discoveries about microtubules make it plausible

so who knows, maybe a dozen exponential improvements in quantum computers could make "AI" really conscious next century

* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa2Kpkksf3k

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Really Chiang?

Alright. What is consciousness? Please provide a definition that somehow encompasses all humans and excludes all current AI.

I’ll wait.